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Proportional representation (PR) is a concept in voting systems used to elect an assembly or council. PR means that the number of seats won by a party or group of candidates is proportionate to the number of votes received. For example, under a PR voting system if 30% of voters support a particular party then roughly 30% of seats will be won by that party. PR is an alternative to voting systems based on single member districts or on bloc voting; these non-PR systems tend to produce disproportionate outcomes and to have a bias in favour of larger political groups. PR systems tend to produce a proliferation of political parties, while single member districts encourage a two-party system.
There are many different forms of proportional representation. Some are focused solely on achieving the proportional representation of different political parties (such as list PR) while others permit the voter to chose between individual candidates (such as PR-STV). The degree of proportionality also varies; it is determined by factors such as the precise formula used to allocate seats, the number of seats in each constituency or in the elected body as a whole, and the level of any minimum threshold for election.
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PR is often contrasted with single winner electoral systems. The most common of these is the single member plurality (or "first-past-the-post") system common in countries of the former British empire, such as the United States, the UK, Canada and India. In these nations most alternative systems tend to be described as forms or types of "proportional representation" but this terminology is inexact and has sometimes (in the British Columbia electoral reform referendum, 2009 and Ontario electoral reform referendum, 2007) resulted in expert advocates using a different set of criteria to decide what to present to the public than the public uses, resulting in referendums that suffer an overwhelming defeat. In particular the focus on party-proportionality was exploited by the "No" campaigns in Ontario, British Columbia and in a similar referendum in Prince Edward Island, which were able to emphasize the shift of power from the public to the parties. In the Ontario case this was particularly effective, as closed-party-list representation had not yet been ruled out.
Proportional systems emphasize the political agenda by parties, since parties often function at the heart of proportional representation. For example, a party that receives 15% of the votes under such a system receives 15% of the seats for its candidates.[1] However, nations with proportional voting may differ in that some emphasize the individuals within the parties, such as the Netherlands Elections in the Netherlands#System, while other nations only allow voting for parties, such as Italy Parliament of Italy#Electoral System.
The majority of debate about voting systems is about whether to move to more proportionality. This is because the established parties in current US and UK elections can, and most often do, win formal control of the parliament with support from as little as 20-25% of eligible voters, at the cost of smaller parties.[2] In Canada the situation is arguably worse with governments regularly formed by parties with support of under 40% of actual voters holding majority power for full four-year terms. Coupled with turnout levels in the electorate of less than 60%, this can lead to a party obtaining a majority government by convincing as few as one quarter of the electorate to vote for them. Additionally, Canada possesses a generally weaker judicial check on power than in the US, and weaker legislative checks on power than in the UK.
Different methods of achieving proportional representation achieve either greater proportionality or a more determinate outcome.[3]
Party-list proportional representation is one approach, in which each political party present its list of candidates: voters chose a party list. The open list form allows the voter to influence the election of individual candidates within a party list. The closed list approach does not: the party chooses the order with its highest ranked candidates more likely to be elected.
Another variation is the single transferable vote (STV) which does not depend on political parties. Voters rank candidates in order of preference: if their most preferred candidate receives insufficient votes, the vote is transferred to the second choice and so on. Elections for the Australian Senate use what is referred to as above-the-line voting where candidates for each party are grouped on the ballot, allowing the voter to vote for the group or for a candidate. In elections to the Irish Dáil Éireann, candidates are listed on the ballot in alphabetic order, irrespective of party affiliation.
Other variations include single non-transferable vote (SNTV), cumulative voting and limited voting, all of which offer a form of semi-proportional representation (SPR).
The emphasis on political parties may reduce PR's effectiveness. Political parties' influence is declining in countries such as the U.S., which in 2004 saw 24% of voters declaring themselves to be independent. In such polities, an alternative such as loser delegation can achieve full representation in a different way.
The parties each list their candidates according to that party's determination of priorities. In closed list systems, voters vote for a list of candidates, with the party choosing the order of candidates on the list [and thus, in effect, their probability of being elected]. Each party is allocated seats in proportion to the number of votes it receives, using the party-determined ranking order. In an open list, voters may vote, depending on the model, for one person, or for two, or indicate their order of preference within the list – nevertheless the number of candidates elected from the list is determined by the number of votes the list receives.
This system is used in many countries, including Finland (open list), Latvia (open list), Sweden (open list), Israel (where the whole country is one closed list constituency), Brazil (open list), the Netherlands (open list), Russia (closed list), South Africa (closed list), Democratic Republic of the Congo (open list). For elections to the European Parliament, most member states use open lists; most of the United Kingdom uses closed lists, but Northern Ireland uses the Single transferable vote, as does Ireland.
Mixed election systems combine a national or regional proportional system with single seat constituencies elected by a plurality system, attempting to achieve some of the positive features of each. Mixed systems are often helpful in countries with large populations, since they balance local and national concerns. They are used in nations with diverse geographic, social, cultural and economic issues.
Such systems, or variations of them, are used in parts of the United Kingdom (the Greater London Authority, the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly), Germany, Lesotho, Mexico, Bolivia and New Zealand. Italy has changed between sub-systems.
This system uses preferential voting.
Each constituency elects two or more representatives per electorate. Consequently the constituency is equivalent in size to the sum of single member constituencies that would produce the same number of representatives. Parties tend to offer as many candidates as they optimistically could expect to win: major parties nominate more than minor parties. Voters rank some or all candidates in order of their choice. A successful candidate must achieve a quota, which is "calculated by dividing the Total Valid Poll by one more than the number of seats to be filled, ignoring any remainder and then adding 1 vote."[4] Only in a few cases is this achieved at the first count. For the second count, if a candidate wins election her/his surplus vote (in excess of the quota) is transferred to the voters' second choices; otherwise, the least popular candidate is eliminated and those votes are redistributed according to the second preference shown on them. If more than one candidate cannot get enough votes after the transfer of votes of the least popular candidate, that candidate is also eliminated (as they would be eliminated on the next round anyway.)
The process repeats until all seats are filled either when the required number of candidates achieve the quota or until the number of remaining candidates matches the number of remaining seats. Although the counting process is complicated, voting is clear and most voters get at least one of their preferences elected.
All deputies are answerable directly to their local constituents. Some political scientists argue that STV is more properly classified as 'semi-proportional' as there is no assurance of a proportional result at a national level. Indeed, many advocates of STV argue that preventing nationwide proportionality is one of the primary goals of the system, to avoid the perceived risks of a fragmented legislature.
This system is used in the Upper House in India, Australia (Senate, Tasmanian and Australian Capital Territory Houses of Assembly and the Legislative Councils in New South Wales, South Australia, Western Australia and Victoria), Ireland, Northern Ireland (assembly, local government and European elections, but not national), Malta, local government elections in Scotland and selected (optional) local governments in New Zealand.
"Loser delegation" voting can produce still greater representation in legislatures. This system allows losing candidates to delegate the votes they receive to the winning candidate in their own or in another district without regard to party. Delegated votes don't affect who enters the legislature, but they do affect subsequent legislative votes. Each representative's legislative votes are weighted by the sum of the direct and delegated votes they received. Delegated voting can be combined with first-past-the-post, instant-runoff, or other counting rules that determine the winning candidate.
For example, consider a district where Alice receives 45% of the votes, while Bob takes 40%, leaving Charlie with the remaining 15%. Under traditional first-past-the-post rules, Alice wins, leaving 55% of the voters without representation. In instant run-off, if 80% of Charlie's voters picked Bob as their second choice, he would win in the second round, with 52% of the final total to Alice's 48%, bringing second-choice representation to 7% of the voters, while leaving Alice's voters without a voice.
Under loser delegation in the instant-runoff case, Bob joins the legislature, while Alice can assign her votes to Dave, who beat Sue with 56% in a nearby district. Now those who voted for Alice have about as much voice in legislation (via Dave) as Bob's voters; nobody is left unrepresented. Bob effectively casts 52 votes, Dave casts 56 + 48 or 104, and also-moderate Fran casts 58 (her winning percentage in a third district.) Of course, the losers in Dave and Fran's districts also get to delegate their votes, so Bob could conceivably end up casting 52 + 44 + 42 or 138 votes.
However, combining delegation with first-past-the-post may be a better choice because that way Charlie can give his votes to Fran instead of seeing them handed to Bob following the runoff. Now Alice casts 45 as her district's representative, Bob delegates his 40 to Sue to add to her 44, Dave stays at 56, and Fran totals 58 + 15 or 73.
The British schoolmaster Thomas Wright Hill is credited as inventor of the single transferable vote, whose use he described in 1821 for application in elections at his school. The method, which guarantees proportional representation, was introduced in 1840 by his son Rowland Hill into the public election for the Adelaide City Council. Unlike several later systems, this did not allow for party-list proportional representation.
Single Transferable Vote was first used in Denmark in 1857, making STV the oldest PR system, but the system used there never really spread. STV was re-invented (apparently independently) in the UK, but the British parliament rejected it.
A party-list proportional representation system was first devised and described in 1878 by Victor D'Hondt of Belgium. The procedure, known as the D'Hondt method, is still widely used. Victor Considérant, a utopian socialist, devised a similar system in an 1892 book. Some Swiss cantons (beginning with Ticino in 1890) preceded Belgium which was the first to adopt list-PR in 1900 for its national parliament. Many European countries adopted similar systems during or after World War I.
STV was used in Tasmania in 1907. In the last Irish elections to the UK Parliament in 1919, STV was used in the University of Dublin constituency; two Independent Unionists were elected. STV has been in use since Irish independence. A mainly centrist party, Fianna Fáil, typically receives 30%-50% of the vote while opposition parties, traditionally the centre-right Fine Gael and the centre-left Labour Party, are comparatively weak. This has led to a series of coalition governments; there has not been a single-party government since 1989.
PR is used by more nations than the plurality voting system, and it dominates Europe, including Germany, most of northern and eastern Europe, and for European Parliament elections. France adopted PR at the end of World War II, discarding it in 1958. In 1986 it was used for parliament elections.
While FPTP is commonly found in countries based on the British parliamentary system, and in Westminster elections in the United Kingdom, the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh National Assembly use a form of PR known as the mixed member system, after New Zealand adopted it in 1993. Five Canadian provinces—British Columbia, Ontario, Quebec, Prince Edward Island and New Brunswick— are debating whether to abolish FPTP.
PR has some history in the United States. Many cities, including New York City, once used it to break up the Democratic Party city councils monopolies on elective office. Cincinnati, Ohio, adopted PR in 1925 to get rid of a Republican Party party, but the Republicans returned the city to FPTP in 1957. From 1870 to 1980, Illinois used a semi-proportional cumulative voting system to elect its State House of Representatives. Each district across the state elected both Republicans and Democrats year-after-year. Cambridge, Massachusetts and Peoria, Illinois continue to use PR. San Francisco had city-wide elections where people would cast votes for five or six candidates simultaneously, delivering some of the benefits of proportional representation.
In his essay, Overcoming Practical Difficulties in Creating a World Parliamentary Assembly, Joseph E. Schwartzberg proposes the use of proportional representation in the United Nations Parliamentary Assembly in order to prevent, for instance, lower castes of Indians from being excluded.[5]
Some nations with proportional elections, like Israel and the Netherlands, have one electoral district only: the entire nation, and the entire pie is cut up according to the entire outcome. Most nations have district systems in place where more than one person is elected per district. The constituency or district magnitude (DM) of a system is therefore measured by the number of seats per constituency. The greater the number of seats in a constituency, the more proportional the outcome will be. PR applied to a single-member district (SMD) is by necessity majoritarian. If the constituency is in a jurisdiction using list PR in its multimember districts (MMDs) the winning candidate simply needs a plurality, otherwise called a simple or relative majority, of the vote to win, so that the election in the SMD is by first-past-the-post. If the constituency is in a jurisdiction using PR-STV in its MMDs, an absolute majority of 50% plus 1 will likely be the minimum required for victory (depending on which quota is used) so that the election in the SMD is by the alternative vote. Four elected officials per district delivers a threshold of 20% (1/M+1) to gain a single seat. However, constituency borders can still be gerrymandered to reduce proportionality. This may be achieved by creating "majority-minority" constituencies - constituencies in which the majority is formed by a group of voters that are in the minority at a higher level. Proportional representation with the entire nation electing the single body cannot be gerrymandered.
Multimember districts do not necessarily ensure that an electoral system will be proportional. The bloc vote can result in "super-majoritarian" results in which geographical variations can create majority-minority districts that become subsumed into the larger districts. Also, a party that does not run enough people to fill all the seats it wins may be given those unfilled seats. This is termed an underhang.
Some nations, with either exclusively proportional representation or—as is the case with Germany—additional member systems, require a party list to achieve an election threshold—a set minimum percentage of votes to receive any seats. Typically, this lower limit is between two and five percent of the number of votes cast. Parties who do not reach that support are not represented in parliament, making majorities, coalitions and thus governments easier to achieve. Proponents of election thresholds argue that they discourage fragmentation, disproportionate power, or extremist parties. Opponents of thresholds argue that they unfairly redirect support from minor parties, giving parties which cross the threshold disproportionate numbers of seats and creating the possibility that a party or coalition will assume control of the legislature without gaining a majority of votes.
The most common way of measuring proportionality is the Gallagher Index.
Israel is a notable example of nationwide proportionally-elected Parliament which happens to be too fragmented, with currently 18 parties. The balance of power is then in the hands of party leaders with idiosyncratic beliefs, or fragmenting the "left" or "right" into too many small parties incapable of campaigning or holding a government together.
To respond to this problem, Israel has tried multiple strategies:
This is a list of countries using proportional representation at national level.
| Country | Type |
|---|---|
| Albania | Party list |
| Algeria | Party list |
| Angola | Party list |
| Australia | For Senate only, Single Transferable Vote |
| Austria | Party list, 4 % threshold |
| Argentina | Party list |
| Aruba | Party list |
| Belgium | Party list |
| Bolivia | Mixed Member Majoritarian |
| Bosnia and Herzegovina | Party list |
| Brazil | Party list |
| Bulgaria | Party list, 4 percent threshold |
| Burkina Faso | Party list |
| Burundi | Party list |
| Cambodia | Party list |
| Cape Verde | Party list |
| Colombia | Party list |
| Costa Rica | Party list |
| Croatia | Party list, 5 percent threshold |
| Curaçao | Party list |
| Cyprus | Party list |
| Czech Republic | Party list, 5 percent threshold |
| Democratic Republic of the Congo | Mixed member proportional |
| Denmark | Party list |
| Dominican Republic | Party list |
| Equatorial Guinea | Party list |
| Estonia | Party list, 5 percent threshold |
| Finland | Party list |
| Germany | Mixed member proportional, 5 percent threshold |
| Greece | Party list (with plurality bonus). |
| Guinea-Bissau | Party list |
| Guyana | Party list |
| Hungary | Mixed Member Majoritarian |
| Iceland | Party list |
| India | For Upper House (Rajya Sabha) only, Single Transferable Vote by State Legislatures |
| Indonesia | Party list |
| Iraq | Party list |
| Ireland | Single Transferable Vote |
| Israel | Party list, 2 percent threshold, with fragmentation so strong that Israel held Prime ministerial elections for a period |
| Italy | Party list (with plurality bonus giving the strongest party/coalition an automatic majority) |
| Japan | Mixed Member Majoritarian |
| Latvia | Party list, 5 percent threshold |
| Lesotho | Mixed Member Majoritarian |
| Liberia | Party list |
| Liechtenstein | Party list, 8 percent threshold |
| Lithuania | |
| Luxembourg | Party list |
| Macedonia [1] | |
| Malta | Single Transferable Vote, small constituencies (no third party got elected since 1966), with possible bonus to give House control to the biggest party |
| Mexico | Mixed Member Majoritarian |
| Moldova | Party list |
| Montenegro[2] | Party list |
| Morocco | Party list, 6 percent threshold |
| Namibia | Party list |
| Nepal | Party list |
| Netherlands | Party list, no threshold to elected 150 members, high fragmentation ; Prime minister is the leader of the first party, but government talks may be long |
| New Caledonia | Party list |
| New Zealand | Mixed Member Proportional 5% threshold |
| Nicaragua | Party list |
| Norway | Party list |
| Paraguay | Party list |
| Peru | Party list |
| Poland | Party list, 5 percent threshold |
| Portugal | Party list |
| Romania | Mixed member proportional representation, 5 percent threshold |
| Russia | Party list |
| San Marino | Party list |
| Sao Tome and Principe | Party list |
| Serbia | Party list |
| Sint Maarten | Party list |
| Slovakia | Party list, 5 percent threshold |
| Slovenia | Party list, 4 percent threshold |
| South Africa | Party list |
| South Korea | Mixed-member majoritarian |
| Spain | Party list, 3 percent threshold, many small constituencies (forms a PR two-party-and-regionalists system, a result of a consensus between the right-wing, which wanted a two-party system with FPTP, and left-wing and regionalists) |
| Sri Lanka | Party list |
| Suriname | Party list |
| Sweden | Party list, 4 percent threshold |
| Switzerland | Party list |
| Taiwan | Mixed Member Majoritarian |
| Thailand | Mixed Member Majoritarian |
| Tunisia | Party list |
| Turkey | Party list, 10 percent threshold, one of the highest, set to limit representation of Kurd independantists |
| Ukraine | Party list |
| United Kingdom | Northern Ireland - Single Transferable Vote (for regional assembly only) Scotland - Additional Member System (for devolved parliament only) Wales - Additional Member System (for national assembly only) |
| Uruguay | Party list |
| Venezuela | Mixed Member Majoritarian |
| Wallis and Futuna | Party list |